With the rise of sensors such as Microsoft Kinect, gesture-based interfaces have become practical. However, to recognize such gestures, applications need access to users' depth and video, exposing sensitive data about individuals and their environment. Prepose, a domain-specifi c language for building gesture recognizers, combined with a system architecture that protects privacy, security, and reliability with untrusted applications, addresses these threats. M ore than 20 million Kinect sensors are in use today, bringing millions of people in contact with games and other applications that respond to voice and gestures. Other companies such as Leap Motion and Prime Sense are bringing low-cost depth and gesture sensing to consumer electronics.
M ore than 20 million Kinect sensors are in use today, bringing millions of people in contact with games and other applications that respond to voice and gestures. Other companies such as Leap Motion and Prime Sense are bringing low-cost depth and gesture sensing to consumer electronics.
User demand for such sensors is driven by exciting new applications, ranging from immersive Xbox games to purpose-built shopping solutions to healthcare applications for monitoring elders. Each of these sensors comes with a so ware developer's kit (SDK) that lets third-party developers build new and compelling applications; some also use the app store model to deliver so ware to end users. Examples of such stores include Leap Motion's Airspace (airspace.com), Oculus Platform, and Google Glassware. ese platforms will evolve to support multiple untrusted applications provided by third parties, running on top of a trusted core such as an OS. Because such applications are likely to be distributed through centralized app stores, there's a chance for application analysis and enforcement of key safety properties.
In this article, we describe speci c threats that applications pose to one another and to the user. (For related work on gesture-building tools and privacy, see the sidebar. For a more comprehensive discussion of threats, we refer the reader to "Operating System Support for Augmented Reality Applications. " 1 ) To address these threats, we introduce Prepose, a novel domain-speci c language and runtime for writing gesture recognizers. We designed this language with semantics in terms of satis ability modulo theories (SMT) formulas, allowing us to use the state-of-the-art SMT solver Z3 for both static analysis and runtime matching of gestures to user movements.
e Prepose project is open source at github.com /Microso /prepose. Figure 1 summarizes three di erent functionality levels for untrusted applications that need gesture recognition. On the bo om, applications can be wri en in languages such as C++ and have access to raw video and depth. Access to the raw video stream is seen as highly privacy sensitive. 2, 3 In the middle, applications are written in memory-safe languages such as C# or Java and have access only to the skeleton API provided by Kinect for Windows. What's less obvious is that, in the middle level, the skeleton data leads to potential loss of privacy. Specifically, the following attacks are possible: ■ The skeleton API reveals how many people are in the room. This might reveal whether an individual is alone. If alone, this person might be a target for robbery; if not alone, this might reveal that this person is involved with someone illicitly. ■ The skeleton API reveals the person's height (relative height of joints is exposed, and the Kinect API allows mapping from skeleton points to depth space, which indicates actual height as well). The application could distinguish people by "fingerprinting" skeletons. ■ The skeleton API reveals the fine-grained position of the person's hands. The application can, in principle, learn something about what a user writes on a whiteboard, for example.
A Case for Controlled Access to Skeletal Data

Background
Prepose compiles gesture descriptions to formulas for an SMT solver such as Z3. 4 These formulas capture the gestures' semantics, enabling precise analyses that boil down to satisfiability queries to the SMT solver. The Prepose language has been designed to be both expressive enough to support complex gestures, yet restrictive enough to ensure that key properties remain decidable. In this article, we focus on four properties regarding reliability and security. Prepose ■ validates that gestures have a basic measure of physical safety, that is, they don't require users to overextend themselves physically in ways that could be dangerous; ■ checks for inner contradictions, that is, it doesn't require users to point their arms both up and down; ■ tests whether a gesture conflicts with a reserved systemwide gesture such as the Kinect attention gesture; and ■ finds potential conflicts in a set of gestures, such as two gestures that would both be recognized from the same user movements.
Related Work on Gesture-Building Tools and Privacy
We describe some gesture-building approaches, mostly from the human-computer interaction community, and touch on privacy in sensing-based applications.
Gesture-Building Tools
Several key projects focus on gesture creation. Prepose's approach is unique in that it focuses on capturing gestures using English-like commands, allowing for easier modification of gesture definitions. Prepose differs from other tools in that it focuses on security and privacy at the level of system design. Proton and Proton++ address multitouch gestures description and recognition. 1, 2 The gestures are modeled as regular expressions, and their alphabet consists of the main actions (down, move, and up) and related attributes such as the move's direction, place or object in which the action was taken, or a counter that represents a relative ID. By describing gestures with regular expressions and a concise alphabet, it's possible to easily identify ambiguity between two gestures prior to the test phase.
The authors of "Rule Based Realtime Motion Assessment for Rehabilitation Exercises" propose a rule-based gesture recognizer for the physiotherapy domain. 3 It exposes rules as an XML considering joints' positions and the corresponding bones' orientations. The "hip abduction" gesture is demonstrated in 48 lines of XML code, which allows later editing and refinement of the gesture.
Gesture Description Language (GDL) presents a domain-specific language for gesture description. 4 Rules are written using the language and are defined by cause (specific body conditions) and effect (resulting Boolean value). GDL uses a near general programming syntax as shown in the following sample code:
The rules can be either logical or numerical, letting developers set thresholds for specific conditions. Rules can be connected by using the previous rules' effect as input.
Lode Hoste and Beat Signer analyze several gesture programming languages, including Proton and GDL, and propose 30 criteria to classify these solutions as well as enhance the discussion about their limitations and future possibilities. 5 The criteria include topics like readability, reliability, customization, and scalability in terms of performance.
Sensing and Privacy
The majority of prior work focuses on privacy concerns in sensing applications. Prepose adds some security concerns into the mix.
SurroundWeb presents an immersive browser that tackles privacy issues by reducing the required privileges. 6 The concept is based on a context-sensing technology that can render different web Continued on page 16
IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY
Security and Privacy Threats in Augmented Reality
Augmented reality (AR) is computing that overlays artificial objects on top of the human senses such that the artificial and the real blend seamlessly. Today, shipping AR experiences come in form factors ranging from magic windows on phones and tablets to high-end headsets, such as Meta or Microsoft HoloLens, that add visual and audio objects to the user's world.
An example of a magic window is Pokémon Go, which became an overnight success by asking people to look through their phones to capture Pokémon while moving around in the real world. An example application of a headset is the Microsoft Galaxy Explorer, which lets the wearer "fly through" the solar system and beyond, using eye gaze and gestures to pick the next planet to visit.
The rise of fast phone processors, ever-cheaper MEMS gyroscopes, inertial sensing units, and advanced high-speed video processing for object registration means that AR capabilities, which used to cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, are now available on commodity phones. Even headsets have dropped to single thousands of dollars, making them within reach for enthusiasts and specialized commercial applications alike.
AR raises fundamental new challenges because, to work properly, applications must continuously sense the environment as well as overlay artificial objects on the real world. In most AR applications, interaction is accomplished through gestures or other visual recognition, which means that applications need some kind of access to video streams or they can't work. How can we support untrusted applications, such as in a phone app store model or the web model, with untrusted pages? How can we prevent applications from maliciously "overwriting" real-world objects or misleading the user?
At the same time, AR has familiar challenges. For example, applications might be written in game frameworks such as Unity, which has a "component store" that lets developers buy new object recognition algorithms or specific 3D models as needed. This store has the same tradeoffs as app stores on phones, game consoles, and tablets: How can we enable as many people content on different parts of the room. To prevent the webpage from accessing the raw video stream of the room, SurroundWeb is proposed as a rendering platform through the Room Skeleton abstraction (which consists of a list of possible room "screens"). Moreover, SurroundWeb introduces a Detection Sandbox as a mediator between webpages and object detection code (never telling the webpages whether objects were detected) and natural user input (mapping the input into mouse events to the webpage).
Darkly includes a privacy protection system to prevent access of raw video data from sensors to untrusted applications. 7 The protection is performed by controlling mechanisms over the acquired data. In some cases, the privacy enforcement (transformations on the input frames) can reduce application functionality.
OS Support for AR Apps and AR Apps with Recognizers accounts for the access the augmented-reality (AR) applications usually have to raw sensors and includes an OS extension to control the sent data by performing the recognizer tasks itself. 8, 9 This way, the recognizer module is responsible for gathering the sensed data and processing it locally, giving only the least needed privileges to AR applications.
Recent work on world-driven access control restricts sensor input to applications in response to the environment-for instance, it can be used to disable access to the camera when in a bathroom. 10 as possible to sell components in the store while still protecting the end user from malicious code? What are the right abstractions and tradeoffs to strike? More generally, this is a problem of safe extensions for a core platform. In this article, we focus on extensions that provide gesture recognition because gestures are crucial for interacting with AR applications.
Single-Application Programming Model
Today, common AR applications assume that only a single application has control of the machine at one time. The application then typically includes a library that talks to the hardware, runs object recognition, and exposes events to the application for processing. For example, a Kinect for Windows application includes a library that talks to the Kinect sensor, runs a machine-learning model to extract the locations of people in Kinect's field of view, then sends an event with detected skeleton positions to the application. A phone application might use a toolkit such as Vuforia to recognize markers in the world or simply use location services to display relevant content, as in Pokémon Go. The key aspect of this model is that the application has complete control of the device.
Multiple Applications
Having multiple applications sharing the same AR raises a host of issues. 1 Here, we focus on the problem of safe extensions for gesture recognition. When there are multiple programs, it's not possible to give each one exclusive access to sensor data, such as a raw video or depth stream. In addition, with untrusted programs such as those found in app stores or on the web, giving access to the raw sensor stream would reveal users' private information. Previous work has addressed this by restricting access to only recognizers, special OS abstractions that encapsulate object detection code. 2 The key downside of this approach is that it requires a fixed set of recognizers that can't be changed by applications.
Programming with Gestures
Today, developers of immersive, sensor-based applications pursue two major approaches to create new gesture recognizers.
The developer might write custom code in a general-purpose programming language such as C++ or C# that checks properties of the user's position and then sets a flag if the user moves in a way to perform the gesture. This approach typically reasons about user movements at a low level, requires the tuning of threshold values, and isn't amenable to automatic reasoning.
The leading alternative to manually coded gesture recognizers is to use machine-learning approaches. To create the recognizer, the developer takes recordings of many different people performing the same gesture, then tags the recordings to provide labeled data. However, gathering the data and labeling it can be expensive. Training itself requires setting multiple parameters, where proper settings require familiarity with the machine-learning approach used. The resulting code created by machine learning might be difficult to interpret or manually "tweak" to create new gestures. Just as with manually written gestures, the resulting code is even more difficult to analyze automatically and requires access to sensor data to work properly.
Techniques
Prepose applications can be composed of gestures, and gestures can be composed of poses and execution steps, as shown by the following written example: Each pose in Prepose is built as one or more actions (point, rotate, put, align, or touch). Each action requires specific parameters; for example, the point action in the Figure 1 . Three levels of data access for untrusted applications that perform gesture recognition. In the middle level, the skeleton data leads to potential loss of privacy. 
Interacting with the Solver
Prepose compiles programs wri en in the Prepose language to formulas in Z3, a state-of-the-art SMT solver. e analysis we focus on here is that of checking that executing the gesture doesn't violate the default safety restrictions. Default safety restrictions are stated in terms of arithmetic constraints on the body's joint coordinates,
represented by a dictionary from joints to real-numbered (3D) coordinates (x, y, z) as well as a dictionary from joints to norms (or reference coordinates). ere are a total of 25 joints, such as ElbowLe and KneeRight, corresponding to the di erent joint types in the Kinect API in Microso .Kinect.dll. For full details, see the DefaultSafetyRestriction method section at github.com /Microsoft/prepose/blob/master/Z3Experiments /Z3Experiments/Gestures/Analysis/Safety.cs. In this se ing, real numbers are modeled by rational numbers, the clear bene t of which is that satis ability checking of the linear arithmetic constraints that arise as a result of the analysis is decidable.
First, each pose is checked for internal validity. is means that the current body constraint (a quanti er-free predicate over the joint constraints) is transformed according to the pose, and the resulting body predicate (also a quanti er-free constraint over the joint constraints because the transformation doesn't introduce quanti ers) is evaluated for satisability in conjunction with a default safety condition.
e default safety condition includes checks such as ensuring that the neck and hips aren't inclined beyond a given thres hold, hips are aligned with the shoulders or at least within a safe range, elbows aren't behind the back and not on the top/back subspace, inclination of wrists toward the back isn't higher than inclination of the elbows unless elbows are up or wrists are directed to torso, and so on. If the transformed body constraint is unsatis able, no instance of the coordinates would correspond to a concrete safe body position, and so the pose is deemed internally invalid.
To illustrate interaction with the Z3 solver, consider the pair of statements "put your le elbow behind your neck" and "put your le elbow to the right of your le shoulder." is pair of statements is in fact internally invalid, as the analysis correctly discovers that pu ing your le elbow behind your neck and to the right of your le shoulder at once isn't feasible for a typical human being. If each pose is internally valid, the poses are composed sequentially. Such sequential composition corresponds to constructing a predicate that describes all the possible body positions from the given initial predicate. Again, the resulting predicate has only positive occurrences of existential quanti ers, that is, it's essentially quanti er free, because a positive occurrence of an existential quanti er corresponds to an uninterpreted constant. Note, however, that negating such a constraint would, in general, no longer be quanti er free if the quanti ers are treated as existential. e current analysis doesn't require operations that would introduce satis ability checking of formulas involving universal quanti ers.
Runtime Execution
A er a Prepose script is translated to Z3 constraints, we use the Z3 solver to match a user's movements to the gesture. e trusted core of Prepose registers with the Kinect skeleton tracker to receive updated skeleton positions of the user.
For each new position, the runtime uses the Z3 term evaluation mechanism to automatically apply gestures to the previous user's position to obtain the target (in a sense, ideal) position for each potential gesture. is target position is in turn compared to the current user's joints position to see if there's a match and to notify the application.
Upon noti cation, the application might then give feedback to the user, such as encouragement, badges for completing a gesture, or movement to a more difcult gesture.
Security and Reliability
By design, Prepose is amenable to sound static reasoning by translating queries into Z3 formulas. We show how to convert key security and reliability properties into Z3 queries. e underlying theory we use is that of reals, which states the problem of determining quanti er-free Boolean expressions as true or false. We also use non recursive data types (tuples) within Z3. Please remember that these are static analyses that typically occur before gestures are deployed to the end user there's no runtime checking overhead.
Augmented reality raises new challenges because applications must continuously sense the environment and overlay artifi cial objects on the real world.
Unlike the approximate runtime matching described earlier, static analysis is about precise, ideal matching. We don't have a theory of approximate equality that's supported by the theorem prover. We treat gestures such as G : B → B, in other words, as functions that transform bodies in set B to new bodies.
Basic Gesture Safety
A set of restrictions is applied to ensure the input gesture is safe. The goal of these restrictions is to make sure we "don't break any bones" by letting the user perform this gesture. We define a collection of safety restrictions pertaining to the head, spine, shoulders, elbows, hips, and legs. R S denotes the compiled restriction-the set of all states allowed under our safety restrictions. The compiled restriction R S is used to test whether, for a given gesture G, ∃b ∈ B : ¬ R S (G(b)). In other words, is there a body that fails to satisfy the conditions of R S after applying G? R S restricts the relative positions of the head, spine, shoulders, elbows, hips, and legs. 
Inner Validity
We also want to ensure that our gestures aren't inherently contradictory. In other words, will all sequences of body positions fail to match a gesture? For example, a gesture that has an inner contradiction is point your arms up, point your arms down.
Obviously both requirements can't be satisfied simultaneously. In the Z3 translation, this will give rise to a contradiction: 
Protected Gestures
Several immersive sensor-based systems include so-called "system attention positions" that users invoke to get privileged access to the system. These are the AR equivalent of Ctrl-Alt-Delete on a Windows system. For example, the Kinect on Xbox has a Kinect Guide gesture that brings up the home screen no matter which game is currently being played. The Kinect "Return to Home" gesture is easily encoded in Prepose; see this gesture here: bit.ly/1JlXk79. For Google Glass, a similar utterance is "Okay Glass. " For Google Now on a Motorola X phone, the utterance is "Okay Google. " We want to ensure that Prepose gestures don't attempt to redefine system attention positions, for instance:
where S ⊂ B is the set of predefined system attention positions.
Conflict Detection
Conflict detection, in contrast, involves two possibly interacting gestures G 1 and G 2 :
Optionally, one could also attempt to test whether gestures' compositions can yield the same outcome. For example, can
This can also be operated as a query on sequences of bodies in B.
Experimental Evaluation
We built a visual gesture development and debugging environment, which we call Prepose Explorer. Figure 2 shows a screenshot of our tool. On the left, a text entry box lets a developer write Prepose code with proper syntax highlighting. On the right, the tool shows the user's current position in green and the target position in white. On the bottom, the tool gives feedback about the current pose being matched and how close the user's position is to the target.
Dimensions of Evaluation
Given that Prepose provides guarantees about security and privacy by construction, we focused on making sure that we could program a wide range of applications that involve gestures, as summarized in Table 1 . Beyond that, we want to ensure that the Prepose-based gesture matching scales well to support interactive games, and so on. To summarize, we used this tool to measure Prepose's expressiveness by creating 28 gestures in three different domains. We then ran some benchmarks to measure runtime and static analysis performance of Prepose.
Prior work has used surveys to evaluate whether the information revealed by various abstractions is acceptable to a sample population of users in terms of its privacy. Here, we give the application the least amount of information required to do its jobs, so these surveys aren't necessary.
Expressiveness
Because the Prepose language isn't Turing complete, there are limitations on the gestures it can express. To determine whether our choices in creating the language are sufficient to handle useful gestures, we built gestures using the Prepose Explorer. We picked three distinct areas: therapy, tai chi, and ballet, which together cover a wide range of gestures. Table 1 shows the breakdown of how many gestures we created in each area-28 in total. To examine these complex gestures, see the code linked to in Table 1 .
Prepose runtime gives feedback not only on when the gesture is completed but also in which part (percentage) of the gesture the user is-in real time. This way, it's possible to save a full log of the session, storing knowledge about each execution, even in cases where the user didn't complete the gesture's final pose. Therefore, it's possible, for example, to report to a physiotherapist a detailed execution of the treatment including the patient performance even if the gesture wasn't finished.
In addition, in the case of therapy, some exercises require users to move their body segments (for instance, arms) within the limits of specific biomechanical body planes (frontal, horizontal, and sagittal). Although body planes aren't yet directly supported by Prepose, these gestures can be written as a tight sequence of motions on the same plane to satisfy these cases. That said, most therapy gestures written in our experiments (such as the "crossover left arm stretch") don't require the definitions of body planes.
Pose-Matching Performance
We used the Kinect Studio tool that ships with Kinect for Windows SDK to record one of the authors' depth and video traces. We recorded a trace of two representative gestures. Each trace was approximately 20 seconds in length and consisted of about 20,000 frames, occupying about 750 Mbytes on disk. We picked these to be two representative tai chi gestures. We performed our measurements on an HP Z820 Pentium Xion E52640 Sandy bridge with six cores and 32 Gbytes of memory running Windows 8.1.
For each trace, we measured the matching timethe time required to evaluate whether the current user position matches the current target position. When a match occurred, we also measured the pose transition time: the time required to synthesize a new target pose, if applicable.
Our results are encouraging. On the first frame, we observed matching times between 78 and 155 ms, but for all subsequent frames, matching times dropped substantially. For these frames, the median matching time was 4 ms with a standard deviation of 1.08 ms. This is fast enough for real-time tracking at 60 frames per second.
For pose transition time, we observed a median time of 89 ms, with a standard deviation of 36.5 ms. Although this led to a "skipped" frame each time we needed to create a new pose, it's still fast enough to avoid interrupting the user's movements.
Although we've made a design decision to use a theorem prover for runtime matching, one can replace that machinery with a custom runtime matcher that's likely to run even faster. When deploying Prepose-based applications on a less powerful platform, such as Xbox, this design change might be justified.
Static Analysis Performance
Here we examine performance in terms of checking for safety, internal validity, and gesture conflicts.
Safety checking. Figure 3a shows a near-linear dependency between the number of steps in a gesture and time to check against safety restrictions. Exploring the results further, we performed a linear regression to see the influence of other parameters, such as the number of negative restrictions. The R 2 value of the fit is approximately 0.9550; this value specifies how well the linear regression fits the input data, 1.0 being the value of the perfect fit. The coefficients in Table 2 show that the number of steps is the gesture aspect, which contributes the most time to check for safety. The median checking time is only 2 ms. We see that safety checking is practical and, given how fast it is, could easily be placed into an integrated development environment (IDE) to give developers quick feedback about invalid gestures.
Validity checking. Figure 3b shows another near-linear dependency between the number of steps in a gesture and the time to check if the gesture is internally valid. The average checking time is 188.63 ms. We see that checking for gestures' internal validity is practical and, given how fast it is, could also easily be placed 
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into an IDE to give developers quick feedback about invalid gestures.
Conflict checking. We performed pairwise conflict checking between 111 pairs of gestures from our domains. Figure 3c shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of conflict checking times, with the x-axis in log scale. For 90 percent of the cases, the checking time is below 0.170 seconds, 97 percent of the cases took less than 5 seconds, and 99 percent took less than 15 seconds. Only one of the 111 queries took longer than 15 seconds. As a result, with a timeout of 15 seconds, only one query would need attention from a human auditor.
W e provide a foundation for programming and reasoning about gesture safety, security, and privacy. Although this article assumes that developers will author the gesture code, we envision numerous possibilities related to automatically inferring Prepose programs by demonstration. [5] [6] [7] This approach has been used in several other areas of programming as well as in interactions with users who aren't necessarily technologically sophisticated. In our context, we can readily foresee useful training scenarios such as ■ a personal trainer at a gym demonstrating a personalized workout program, which gets notated as Prepose gestures and given to the gym-goer to use for home exercises; and ■ a doctor working with patients with limited mobility who works on adapting user interfaces. 8 The doctor can demonstrate a gesture that corresponds to a mouse double-click and have that recorded by Prepose.
In both these cases, an intermediary specialist is working with a Prepose-equipped Kinect sensor, whose goal is to learn Prepose gestures for later use by end users. 
